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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
LAWRENCE PITTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20290 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
The defendant, Lawrence Pitts, was charged by 
information with Burglary, a felony of the Third Degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended. After 
a trial by jury on September 25 and 26, 1984 in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding, 
defendant was found guilty of Burglary. On September 26, 1984, 
defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate term as provided by 
law of zero to five years in the Utah State Penitentiary. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On August 4, 1984, sometime after noon and before store 
closing time at 1:00 a.m., some blank checks and an envelope 
containing a bank statement and endorsed checks were stolen from 
a Handy Pantry convenience store in Salt Lake City (T. 14, 15). 
The items were taken from an office in the back room, which is 
off limits to the public (T. 22). The door to the back room is 
generally kept open except when Preston Tholen, the store owner, 
is working in his office (T. 13) and the door was open during the 
time in question on August 4 (T. 14) . On each side of the door 
a sign is posted which states "Employees only. Others will be 
prosecuted. Management." (T. 13). This sign is clearly visible 
to anyone walking down the store aisle toward the back room (T. 
17, 119). 
The bank statement had been delivered that day and an 
employee had put it on top of the owner's desk (T. 10-11). The 
blank checks were kept hidden in an envelope in the back of a 
small carry box under the desk (T. 24, 31). Although four blank 
checks and the envelope containing the bank statement were 
recovered, five blank checks and thirty to forty of the endorsed 
checks from the statement were never recovered by the police (T. 
24, 31, 33). The five blank checks were forged against the store 
owner and later returned by the bank (T. 32). 
Two Handy Pantry employees, Valerie Swaner and Creed 
Anderson, saw defendant in the store around 7:00 p.m. on August 4 
(T. 36). Defendant's common-law wife, Ordena Longton, testified 
that on that evening she, defendant, and another woman drove to 
Handy Pantry in her yellow Datsun to buy some formula for her 
baby (T. 51-53). Defendant and the unidentified other woman went 
into the store while Ms. Longton made a telephone call (T. 53). 
As the defendant, Ms. Longton and the woman drove away from the 
store, Ms. Longton noticed that defendant had an envelope similar 
to the one later identified as being stolen from the Handy Pantry 
(T. 54-55). When she asked defendant about the envelope, he told 
her it contained checks and that "they weren't for him, that 
somebody else could use them" (T. 55-56). Defendant then took 
Ms. Longton home and left in her car (T. 56-57). 
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At about 11:00 p.m. that night defendant drove to the 
home of Sharon Spencer in Ms. Longton1s yellow Datsun (T. 72). 
While defendant and Ms. Spencer had a conversation in the car, 
Ms. Spencer saw an envelope similar to the stolen one between the 
driver and passenger seats (T. 13). When she reached for the 
envelope, defendant moved it away from herf either onto his lap 
or by his side (T. 74). He later carried the envelope with him 
into Ms. Spencer1s house (T. 75, 81). Both Ms. Spencer and her 
roommate Merna Norwick testified that defendant watched 
television at their house for a few hours and then fell asleep on 
the couch with the envelope in front of him on the coffee table 
(T. 75-76, 83). In the morning defendant, the envelope and the 
yellow Datsun were gone (T. 76, 84). 
On the morning of August 5, police office David Rowley 
was looking for defendant as part of an investigation of a theft 
reported by Sharon Spencer (T. 104-105). He was also looking for 
the yellow Datsun which was involved in a "breach of trust11 
reported by Ordena Longton (T. 63, 104-105). He located both 
defendant and the Datsun at Second North and Fifth West in Salt 
Lake City, (T. 104-105). The checks and the bank statement were 
found in the glove compartment of Ms. Longton1s Datsun (T. 93). 
Defendant denied any knowledge of the checks, but Ms. Longton 
told the police that defendant had come out of the Handy Pantry 
in possession of the checks and that defendant knew someone who 
could "pass the checks for thousands" (T. 103, 110). The police 
contacted Preston Tholen and determined that the bank statement 
and the checks had been taken from the store and defendant was 
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then charged with burglary (T. 100-101). At trial, after a 
little over an hour of deliberation, the jury found defendant 
guilty of burglary. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court did not err in denying defendants 
request for a jury instruction regarding theft as a lesser 
included offense of burglary. The two offenses are not 
sufficiently related for theft to be considered included in 
burglary. They protect entirely different interests, proof of 
theft is not generally presented as part of the showing of the 
commission of burglary, and they address competely separate acts. 
Theft merely serves on occasion as circumstantial evidence of an 
element of burglary. Moreover, there was not a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to provide a rational basis for acquitting 
defendant of burglary and convicting him of theft. Defendant 
presented no evidence to support his theory of the case; he 
merely asserts on appeal that the sign prohibiting entry into the 
back room was not noticeable and that therefore his entry was 
licensed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
holding that the back room was clearly not open to the public and 
that defendant was not entitled to a lesser included offense jury 
instruction. 
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's 
motion to dismiss the charge of burglary for the State's failure 
to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. 
The State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of 
defendant's entry into the back room. Defendant's entry was 
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shown to be unlawful because there was uncontroverted evidence of 
a sign prohibiting entry and that the store's owner did not allow 
the public into the back room* Furthermore, since at trial 
defendant did not attempt to assert that he assumed that he had 
consent or explain away the evidence that no consent existed in 
fact, the State had no obligation to prove his state of mind. 
Defendant's possession of the stolen property along with his lies 
about that possession served as sufficient evidence of his intent 
to commit a theft at the time of his unlawful entry* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THEFT AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF BURGLARY WAS CORRECT. 
At trial, defendant requested that instructions be 
given on theft as a lesser included offense of burglary. The 
court refused this request, and defendant objected (T. 166-167). 
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to 
give the instructions constitutes reversible error. Defendant 
relies on the recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Bakerf 
Utah, 671 P.2d 152 (1983), to support his claim. 
In £j£Lkj£X, this Court addressed the Utah lesser included 
offense statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (1953) as 
amended, which provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged. 
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This Court set forth two different standards to be applied when a 
lesser included offense instruction is requested. When the 
prosecution requests the instruction the trial court should use 
the "necessarily included offense" standard to determine if the 
instruction should be given. This strict standard requires a 
comparison of the abstract statutory elements of the offenses, 
and is necessary to ensure that the defendant has had notice of 
and opportunity to defend against the lesser offense: "his 
defense against the greater will of necessity, be a defense 
against the lesser also, with regard to both the law and the 
facts alleged." £ak£j:, at 156. When the defendant requests the 
instruction, however, the court should apply the more flexible 
evidence-based standard. The Court expressed concern that 
without the option of convicting of a lesser offense, when an 
element of the charged offense is in doubt but the defendant is 
plainly guilty of some offense, the jury may opt to convict 
rather than to fulfill its duty to acquit. This more lenient 
standard is therefore necessary to afford the defendant the full 
benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. 
Under the evidence-based analysis, a two-pronged test 
must be met before a defendant is entitled to a lesser included 
offense instruction. First, the trial court must determine if 
the "two offenses are related because some of their statutory 
elements overlap and . . . [if] the evidence at the trial of the 
greater offense includes proof of some or all of those 
overlapping elements . . . " Hakex at 159. If so, the lesser 
offense is included in the greater. Second, the court must 
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determine if Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953) as amended is 
satisfied, i.e., if "there is a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense.11 In the present case, defendant was 
not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction regarding 
theftf because neither prong of the BaKex test was met. 
A. DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THEFT AS A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY BECAUSE 
THE TOO OFFENSES ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
RELATED TO BE CONSIDERED INCLUDED. 
Defendant claims that there is a statutory overlap of 
the two offenses of burglary and theft and that therefore the 
first prong of the EaJuej: test is met. The elements of burglary, 
as charged in this case, are: 
1) entering or remaining in a building or any portion 
of a building 
2) doing so unlawfully 
3) doing so intentionally or knowingly 
4) doing so with the intent to commit a theft 
(see jury instruction #19, Appendix) 
The elements of theft are: 
1) exercising unauthorized control over the property 
of another 
2) doing so with the intent to deprive the owner of 
the property 
(see defendant's requested instruction #4, Appendix). 
Although defendant frames the issue somewhat differently, his 
argument is essentially that since he was charged with a 
-7-
variation of burglary that proscribes entering or remaining 
unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a theft, the 
statutory elements of theft and burglary overlap. He further 
claims that this overlap is sufficient to satisfy the second 
prong of fiakfij:. 
This analysis involves only a superficial comparison of 
the language constituting the statutes describing the two 
offenses, and is a misapplication of the ILaJuex standard. 
Although it is true that an insignificant statutory overlap does 
exist, the central elements of the two offenses are entirely 
different and do not overlap. The gravamen of burglary is the 
unlawful entering or remaining in a building, and the element of 
intent to commit theft merely amounts to the equivalent of an 
aggravating circumstance raising to burglary the less serious 
unlawful entry or remaining proscribed by criminal trespass. 
Theft, a crime involving the taking of another's property, is 
simply not inherently related to burglary. The two offenses 
protect different interests and are committed by completely 
different acts. Traditionally, the State has been able to charge 
a defendant with both offenses when intent to commit a theft 
underlies the burglary and a theft is completed during the same 
criminal episode. (See, e.g. Rogerson v. Harris. Ill Utah 330, 
178 P.2d 397 (1947), State v. Jones. 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 
(1962) . 
In Baker, this Court warned against using the sort of 
analysis urged here by defendant to find two such unrelated 
offenses included: 
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This requirement that there exist some overlap 
in the statutory elements of allegedly "included" 
offenses would prevent the argument that totally 
unrelated offenses could be deemed included 
simply because some of the evidence necessary to 
prove one crime was also necessary to prove the 
other. For example, evidence proving theft in 
a trial involving only a charge of first degree 
homicide would not make theft a lesser included 
offense under § 76-1-402(3)(a) because none of 
the statutory elements of theft and homicide overlap. 
£aJi£X at 159. 
Defendant's mechanistic and superficial comparison of the 
language of the two statutes without regard to the true nature of 
the offenses they describe would allow unrelated offenses to be 
deemed included if the lesser offense were incidentally proved in 
the course of proving the greater. Since Baker this Court has 
not further elaborated on how extensive a statutory overlap must 
be to meet the first prong of Baker, However, other 
jurisdictions interpreting evidence-based standards similar to 
that set forth in Baker have developed a method of statutory 
comparison that is consistent with the policies underlying the 
lesser included offense doctrine. These courts have identified 
several factors to be considered in determining when two offenses 
are sufficiently related for the lesser to be deemed included in 
the greater. 
In United States v. Whitaker. 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), cited several times in fiakeXr the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to analyze the 
difference between the two standards to be used in determining 
when a lesser included offense instruction is warranted. 
Whitaker had requested a jury instruction regarding unlawful 
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entry as a lesser included offense of burglary. The trial court 
denied the request, holding that unlawful entry was not a lesser 
included offense of burglary. The court reasoned that the 
offense of unlawful entry required the element of entry without 
authority and against the will of the lawful occupant, while 
certain variations of burglary did not require the entry to be 
unlawful for conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating 
that since the evidence showed that the defendant's entry had 
indeed been unauthorized, "it is unrealistic and artificial, on 
the statute involved, the indictment, and the proof in this case 
to deny a lesser included offense instruction on unlawful entry." 
Whitaker at 320. Thus the strict "necessarily included offense" 
analysis employed by the trial court had been inappropriate. 
Since the defendant rather than the prosecution had requested the 
instruction,a more natural and realistic evidence-based standard 
should have been used. The trial court should have given the 
jury instructions if the lesser offense had been established by 
the evidence presented at trial in proof of the greater offense. 
However, the court added a caveat that: 
there must also be an "inherent" relationship 
between the greater and lesser offenses, 
i.e., they must relate to the protection of 
the same interests, and must be so related 
that in the general nature of these crimes, 
though not necessarily invariably, proof of 
the lesser offense is necessarily presented 
as part of the showing of the commission of 
the greater offense. This latter stipulation 
is prudently required to foreclose a tendency 
which might otherwise develop towards misuse 
by the defense of such rule. In the absence 
of such restraint defense counsel might be 
tempted to press the jury for leniency by 
requesting lesser included offense 
instructions on every lesser crime that could 
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arguably be made out from any evidence that 
happened to be introduced at trial. "An 
element of the mercy-dispensing power is 
doubtless inherent in the jury system, and 
may well be a reason why a defendant seeks a 
lesser included offense instruction, but it 
is not by itself a permissible basis to 
justify such an instruction." 
Whitaker at 319f citing 
Kelly v. United States, 
125 U.S. App. D.C. at 
207, 370 F.2d at 229 
(1966). 
This warning mirrors the Baker court's concern that this more 
lenient evidence-based standard might be abused. Moreover, the 
"inherent relationship" test is designed to protect against the 
same possible abuses by defense counsel that prompted the Baker 
court to require that the two offenses be "related". Therefore, 
the "inherent relationship" test, as it is employed in Whitaker 
and in later cases applying WhitakerP is helpful in determining 
the parameters of the "relationship" required by the Baker 
evidence-based analysis. 
The Whitaker court found that there was an inherent 
relationship between the two offenses of burglary and unlawful 
entry since "the criminal activity proscribed by the two offenses 
violates the same interest - that of the property owner in 
protecting the integrity of his premises" Whitaker at 319. 
Various state and federal jurisidctions have adopted 
the "inherent relationship" test. Several of these courts have 
applied the test to two allegedly related offenses and determined 
that one offense was not a lesser included offense of the other. 
In Ballard v, United States, 430 A.2d 483 (D.C. App. 1981), the 
defendant had been charged with both rape and carnal knowledge and 
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appealed, claiming that carnal knowledge was a lesser included 
offense of rape and that therefore he should not have been charged 
with both offenses. This was not a case where the defendant had 
requested a lesser included offense jury instruction. 
Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied 
the "inherent relationship" test. The court reasoned that since 
the interest violated by the offense of rape is the injury to the 
feelings of the victim by the forceful violation of her person, 
and the interest violated by the offense of carnal knowledge is 
the sexual innocence of females below the age of sixteen, carnal 
knowledge is not a lesser included offense of rape. Similarly, in 
People v. May, 91 111.2d 251, 437 N.E.2d 633 (1982), the Illinois 
Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's rape conviction and held 
that he had not been entitled to a jury instruction on battery by 
bodily harm as a lesser included offense because the two offenses 
did not have an inherent relationship and protected different 
interests. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States 
v. Zangr 703 F.2d 1186 (1982), held that regulatory violations 
were not lesser included offenses of conspiracy, mail or wire 
fraud or racketeering, since the elements, proof and interests 
protected differed greatly. 
Two recent Washington cases are especially similar to 
the present case. In both cases the defendants had requested jury 
instructions regarding possession of stolen property as a lesser 
included offense of burglary. Although in each case the courts 
purported not to use the "inherent relationship" test, they 
effectively applied that test in reaching the conclusion that the two 
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offenses were not included. In State v. Chelly, 32 Wash. App. 916 
651 P.2d 759 (1982)f despite the defendant's argument that his 
possession of the stolen property was the only direct evidence to 
connect him with the burglary, the Washington Court of Appeals 
stated that "we do not believe that possession of stolen property 
is so closely related to burglary as to make it a lesser included 
offense . . . " £h£ll£ at 762. In State v. Johnson, 100 Wash.2d 
607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), the Washington Supreme Court also 
declined to apply the "inherent relationship" test in a similar 
case because: 
[elven federal cases have applied the 
"inherent relationship" test only to lesser 
offenses which were in fact part of the same 
.act . . . [h]eref in contrast, the possession 
of stolen property was an act entirely 
subsequent to the unlawful entry with intent 
to commit theft which constituted the 
burglary. The mere fact that evidence of the 
former offense was used to circumstantially 
prove the latter does not make it a lesser 
included offense* 
Johnson at 158. (emphasis added) 
Thus, when the Baker standard is viewed in the context 
of similar standards in other jurisdictions, its true purpose and 
limits emerge. The original distinction, made in Whitaker, 
between the "necessarily included" standard and the "evidence 
based" standard was designed to avoid the unfair result reached 
under a purely technical analysis - that simply because the lesser 
offense was not included in every variation of the greater 
offense, the defendant was never entitled to a jury instruction on 
the lesser offense. On the other hand, the fact that the 
defendant has a more lenient standard to meet when requesting a 
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lesser included offense jury instruction does not mean he should 
be allowed to abuse that leniency by demanding "that totally 
unrelated offenses be deemed included simply because some of the 
evidence necessary to prove one crime was also necessary to prove 
the other." Baker at 159. Therefore an evidence-based analysis 
should go further than a superficial comparison of the elements of 
the statutes describing the allegedly related offenses. Rather, 
the factors specified in Whitaker and in the cases following it 
should be considered in addition to the statutory elements in 
determining whether the offenses are sufficiently related for the 
lesser to be deemed included in the greater. Thusf the court 
should consider whether the interests violated by the two offenses 
are the same, whether in the general nature of the crimes proof of 
the lesser is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the 
commission of the greater offense, and whether the two offenses 
are part of the same act. In addition, the court should be aware 
of the fact that simply because commission of the lesser offense 
is circumstantial evidence of the greater offense does not mean 
that the lesser is included in the greater. An analysis using 
these factors will produce a sounder and more realistic 
interpretation of the Baker standard than does the analysis urged 
by defendant. 
In the case at bar, no "inherent relationship" exists 
between the offenses of burglary and theft. The interest violated 
by burglary is that of "the security of habitation or occupancy, 
rather than ownership or property" 3 Wharton's Criminal Law, § 3 26 
(C. Torcia 14th ed. 1980). Conversely, the interest violated by 
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theft is that of "the right of property or possession" Id. § 354 
(Cf. Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1969) , 
where the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit 
recognized this difference between the two offenses in noting that 
cumulative sentences were allowed for robbery (an offense closely 
related to theft) and housebreaking (an offense closely related to 
burglary). The court described robbery and housebreaking as 
"crimes of historically different conception, protecting 
distinctly different societal interests, and affording protection 
against markedly different dangers.") Furthermore, it is not true 
that in the general nature of the crimes of burglary and theft, 
proof of theft is necessarily presented as part of the showing of 
the commission of burglary. The offense of burglary is committed 
if the actor enters or remains unlawfully in a building or part of 
a building with the intent to commit assault or any felony as well 
as with the intent to commit theft. Accordingly, proof of intent 
to commit assault rather than theft can be part of the showing of 
the commission of burglary, State v. Nebeker, Utah, 657 P.2d 1360 
(1983), as well as proof of intent to commit a felony such as 
arson. State v- Smith, Utah, 621 P.2d 697 (1980). Further, intent 
to commit a theft can be shown without proof of a completed theft 
State v. Clements. 26 Utah 298, 488 P.2d 1044 (1921). (£££ 
generally, Rogerson v. Harris, SIISXA, and State Vt Jones, .sucta.) 
The two offenses address two entirely separate acts; burglary 
addresses unlawful entry or remaining and theft addresses the 
unauthorized control over the property of another. Clearly then, 
there is no inherent relationship between the offenses of theft 
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and burglary,. Therefore the trial court was correct in denying 
defendant's requested jury instruction since granting the request 
would have condoned exactly the misuse by defendant against which 
the Whitaker and £aJi£i: courts warned. 
The State must concede that the "inherent relationship" 
test for which it argues above is not supported by this court's 
recent decision in State v. Brown, Utah, 694 P.2d 587 (1984). 
In BxsMn, this Court held in a j^ ar curiam decision that the trial 
court should have granted the defendant's request for a jury 
instruction regarding simple assault as a lesser included offense 
of aggravated kidnapping. The elements of the offenses that were 
relevant in light of the evidence were: 
Utah Code Ann.f § 76-5-102 (1953) as amended. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show 
of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953) as amended. Aggravated 
Kidnapping. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping 
[sic] when he intentionally or knowingly 
by force, threat or deceit, detains or 
restrains another against his will with intent: 
• • • . 
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize victim or another; . . . . 
In its analysis, this Court merely said the first prong of Baker 
was met because "some" overlap existed in the definitions of the 
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two offenses "as a comparison of the elements of assault and 
kidnapping . . . shows" ajLQMJlf at 589-90. However, when the 
"inherent relationship" test is applied, it can be seen that 
although some superficial statutory overlap does exist, the two 
offenses of aggravated kidnapping and assault are unrelated. No 
inherent relationship exists between the offenses of assault and 
aggravated kidnapping. The interests violated by the two offenses 
are completely different. The offense of kidnapping violates the 
victim1s interest in freedom of movement, while the offense of 
assault violates the victim's interest in his physical safety and 
freedom from bodily harm. The two offenses address different 
acts. The gravamen of kidnapping is the act of unlawful restraint 
while the gravamen of assault is the act of threatening or 
attempting to inflict bodily harm on another. Additionally, in 
Brown the assault statute overlaps with only the aggravating 
portion of the aggravating kidnapping statute. Therefore, the 
Brown holding that assault is included in aggravated kidnapping 
results in the anomalous situation that a defendant charged with 
the more serious crime of aggravated kidnapping may be entitled to 
a lesser included offense instruction regarding assault, while if 
he had been charged with the less serious offense of simple 
kidnapping he would not be entitled to the instruction. This 
result is illogical, but inevitably follows from the inter-
pretation of the Baker standard used in BXSMH and urged by 
defendant in the present case. Respondent urges this Court to 
abandon the sort of analysis used in Brown for this and any future 
case, and to adopt the more appropriate "inherent relationship" 
test. 
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B. DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THEFT 
AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
BURGLARY BECAUSE A SUFFICIENT 
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE DID NOT EXIST 
TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR A 
VERDICT ACQUITTING HIM OF BURGLARY 
AND CONVICTING HIM OF THEFT. 
Even if theft were closely enough related to burglary 
to be considered a lesser included offense, the trial court would 
not be obligated to give a lesser included offense instruction 
unless in the evidence adduced at trial "there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the lesser offense.11 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(4) (1953) as amended. Defendant claims that there was a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting him of burglary and 
convicting him of theft. Defendant's argument is that unlawful 
entry into a portion of a building is an element required for 
conviction of burglary (see jury instruction #19, Appendix) and 
that there is evidence that his entry was licensed and therefore 
lawful. Defendant contends that on the basis of this evidence the 
jury "may have concluded that Mr. Pitts was merely guilty of 
wandering to the bathroom and stealing checks along the way" 
(Appellant1s brief at 8) and that he was therefore guilty of theft 
rather than burglary. 
In support of his argumentf he cites State v. Chestnut, 
Utah, 621 P.2d 1228f 1232 (1980), in which this Court stated that 
any evidence "however slight, on any reasonable theory of the 
case" under which he might have been convicted of theft rather 
than burglary, is sufficient to warrant the jury instruction on 
theft. Defendant interprets this statement to mean that if he can 
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invent any theory of the case that is supported by even the most 
far-fetched view of the evidence, the trial court has no 
discretion to deny his requested lesser included offense 
instruction. This reasoning ignores both the plain language of 
the statute and the case law, including HakfiXf interpreting the 
statute. 
The Baker this Court characterized the evidence-based 
standard as follows: "When the elements of two offenses overlap 
• . . , if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a 
jury question regarding the lesser offense, then the court should 
instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense." EaJifii at 159. 
The second step of the £aJi£X analysis requires the trial court to 
decide whether a sufficient quantum of evidence has been presented 
to justify sending the question to the jury. Even Chestnut, which 
defendant cites for its "any evidence" language, requires the 
court to determine whether there is any evidence on any reasonable 
theory of the case - in other words, whether the defendant's 
theory of the case is reasonable. "It is the prerogative and the 
responsibility of the trial court to make the preliminary 
determination as to what offense reasonable minds might find from 
the evidence." State v. Lopez. Utah, 626 P.2d 483, 486 (1981). 
In State v. Tucker, Utah, 618 P.2d 46 (1980), this Court discussed 
§ 76-1-402(4) and stated that "ti]n deciding whether or not such a 
rational basis exists, the trial court must necessarily be 
accorded a certain amount of discretion." JLd. at 50. 
That such discretion exists in the trial court is 
confirmed by the holdings of the cases applying § 76-1-402(4). In 
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several cases both before and after fLaJteJLr this court has affirmed 
the trial court's finding of a lack of a sufficient quantum of 
evidence to warrant the requested jury instruction regardless of 
the fact that sims. evidence on the defendant's theory of the case 
was presented. In State v. Tucker, su^za, this Court held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there 
was no rational basis in the evidence to support the defendant's 
requested jury instruction on joy-riding as a lesser included 
offense of theft of a motor vehicle. The trial court declined to 
give the instruction even though the defendant testified that he 
had intended to return the car, but when the police began to 
pursue him, he panicked and tried to escape. In State v. Lopez, 
supraf this Court affirmed the appellant's conviction of second 
degree murder. The trial court had refused to give a jury 
instruction on the lesser included offense of the variation of 
manslaughter which proscribes the killing of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which 
there was a reasonable explanation. The jury instruction was 
refused despite the defendant's testimony that the fight in which 
the victim was killed was a result of an earlier argument between 
the defendant and the victim. In State v. Clayton, Utah, 658 P.2d 
624 (1983), this Court affirmed the defendant's conviction of 
attempted second degree murder. The defendant had testified that 
he and the victim had had a fight fifteen minutes before the 
shooting, and that he shot the victim to protect himself against 
an anticipated knife attack. He then claimed that this testimony 
provided evidence that he killed the victim either in the 
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heat of passion or in the reasonable belief that the circumstances 
provided a moral or legal justification for his conduct. 
Nonetheless, the trial court found no rational basis for the jury 
to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder, 
and refused to give the lesser included offense jury instruction. 
In State v. Shabata. Utah, 678 P.2d 791 (1984), the trial court 
refused to give the defendant's requested jury instruction on 
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second degree murder 
because his theory of the case precluded the instruction. This 
Court affirmed the conviction and said in dicta that the evidence 
that the defendant had had an affair with the victim's wife would 
not have been sufficient to warrant giving the instruction. In 
each of the foregoing cases, there was some evidence to support 
the defendant's claim of entitlement to a lesser included offense 
jury instruction. Nevertheless, in each case the trial court 
determined in its discretion that there was no rational basis in 
the evidence to warrant the requested instruction, and in each 
case this Court affirmed. 
Thus the trial court has discretion to decide whether 
the evidence supporting the defendant's theory of the case meets 
the second prong of the Jiak&r test; i.e., constitutes a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to provide a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the greater and convicting him of the 
lesser offense. It therefore follows that a trial court ruling on 
a lesser included offense instruction should be reversed only for 
in abuse of that discretion. In the case at bar there was no such 
ibuse of discretion. The evidence to which defendant points to 
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support his contention that his entry into the back room of the 
Handy Pantry was licensed does not constitute the required 
rational basis to acquit him of burglary and convict him of theft. 
It is true that the Handy Pantry was open to the public at the 
time of the burglary and that the door to the back room was open. 
Howeverr it is undisputed that the back room was in fact not open 
to the public. Furthermore, defendant and all other patrons of 
the store were on notice of this fact. One of the reasons that 
the trial court is accorded discretion in this determination is 
that it requires an evaluation of the evidence. The trial judge, 
who is present during the testimony and the presentation of the 
physical evidence, is therefore more qualified than an appellate 
court to perform this function. In the instant case Judge Banks 
was able to view the evidence of the photographs of the door 
leading to the back room and the signs posted on that door. In 
denying defendants motion to dismiss, Judge Banks said 
Well, it is obvious from the photographs 
and the testimony that this was not a portion 
of the building open to the public in spite 
of the sign itself, and I donft have any 
trouble reading that sign walking straight 
back from even this photograph . . . It is 
obvious that that is not a portion of the 
building open to the public. Your shelves 
and so forth on the outside and the 
appearance as you enter the door itself shows 
an office space there. It is a retail store. 
Your motion is denied. 
(T. 119). Morever, although it is true that the store's only 
bathroom was located in the back room, there was no evidence that 
defendant was even aware of that fact. 
Most important, in all of the cases in which this Court 
has held that the evidence adduced at trial warranted the giving 
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of a lesser included offense jury instruction, the holding has 
explicitly rested at least in part on the fact that the 
defendant's testimony provided some of the evidence supporting his 
theory of the case. ££&, e.g., State v, Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 23 P. 
349 (1924) (in view of the defendant's testimony which was in 
irreconcilable conflict with that of the prosecuting witness, the 
jury should have been instructed on assault as a lesser included 
offense of assault with intent to commit rape); State v. Gillianf 
23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970) (the defendant's testimony 
that she was in such a state of emotional upset that she fired 
shots into a room to scare her boyfriend was evidence that would 
allow the jury to find her guilty of manslaughter as a lesser 
included offense of first degree murder); State v. Close, 28 Utah 
2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972) (the defendant's testimony that he and 
the victim were never by themselves, corroborated by the victim's 
sister, was evidence providing a basis which would justify a 
verdict of guilty of simply assault as a lesser included offense 
of indecent assault); State v. Chestnutf supra (the defendant's 
testimony that he had tried to awaken the motorcycle's owner to 
ask permission to ride it and that he had intended to return the 
motorcycle was part of the evidence placing his intent to deprive 
the owner of the motorcyle in doubt, warranting a jury instruction 
m joyriding as a lesser included offense of theft of a motor 
vehicle); State v. Elliott. Utah, 641 P.2d 122 (1982) (the 
evidence adduced at trial, particularly the defendants' testimony, 
.n which they admitted commission of assault but denied 
:ommission of sodomy or intent to commit sodomy, established a 
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rational basis for a verdict acquitting them of aggravated sexual 
assault and convicting them of the lesser included offenses of 
assault or aggravated assault); State v. Oldroyd. Utah, 685 P.2d 
551 (1984) (given the defendant's testimony that the gun was 
unloaded and that he did not point the gun at the police officers, 
his intent to threaten the officers was clearly in dispute and a 
jury could rationally acquit him of aggravated assault and convict 
him of threatening with a dangerous weapon); and State v. Brownf 
supra, (the defendant's testimony that the victim started the 
fight and injured him and that his only response was to bite her, 
although not particularly credible, was evidence that would permit 
the jury to acquit him of aggravated kidnapping and convict him of 
assault.*) 
In the present case, defendant not only did not 
testify, but did not even present any evidence to support his 
theory of the case. His bald assertions on appeal that the signs 
prohibiting entry into the back room were not noticeable and that 
* The Brown holding is confusing, however, because it seems to 
rely on a different standard for the second prong of the Baker 
test than that used in any other cases. As shown previously, all 
other lesser included offense cases, including a case decided 
after EraSil], State v. Smith, No. 18839, slip op. (Utah May 10, 
1985), require either "a sufficient quantum of evidence to 
provide a rational Msls to acquit of the greater and convict of 
the lesser" (emphasis added) or "any evidence or any reasonable 
theory of the case." (emphasis added). In Rismn, however, this 
Court states the standard thus: "the judge's sole function is to 
determine whether there is gny evidence that, if believed by the 
jury, would permit the jury to acquit the defendant of the 
greater offense and convict defendant of the lesser." Brown at 
590. Respondent submits that the Brown standard is inconsistent 
with the statute, § 76-1-402(4) (see BxflMH dissent), and urges 
this Court to affirm the "rational basis" standard as the correct 
one. 
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therefore he was licensed to enter are completely unsupported by 
any evidence, as is shown by Judge Banks1 observation at trialf 
quoted £U£JLa. As the Arizona Supreme Court commented, "a 
defendant is entitled to instructions on the lesser offenses if a 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence indicates that he could 
be guilty of those offenses • • . [however] . . • [tlhe law does 
not require instructions on all offenses theoretically included in 
every criminal information based on the possibility that the jury 
might simply disbelieve the State's evidence." State v. Wilson, 
113 Ariz. 363, 367, 555 P.2d 321, 325 (1976). Since there was no 
evidence providing a rational basis to both acquit defendant of 
burglary and convict him of theft, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying defendant's request for a jury 
instruction on theft as a lesser included offense of burglary. 
Therefore, the defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE 
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF BURGLARY. 
At trial, after the State rested its case, defendant 
tioved to dismiss the charge, claiming tha t the Sta te fa i led to 
present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of 
burglary (T. 116). The trial court denied the motion (T. 119), 
md on appeal defendant claims that this denial constituted 
reversible error. Defendant argues that the State failed to 
>resent sufficient evidence of two elements of burglary; the act 
»f unlawful entry, and the intent to commit a theft at the time of 
ntry. There was more than sufficient evidence to establish both 
f the above elements of burglary. 
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A. THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABISH THE ELEMENT 
OF UNLAWFUL ENTRY. 
Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove 
that he even entered the back room, because no witnesses were 
produced who saw him either present in the back room, or enter or 
exit the back room. While no direct evidence was presented, there 
was sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant's entry into 
the back room to warrant denying his motion to dismiss and 
submitting the case to the jury. Lorna Strasberg, a Handy Pantry 
employee, said she had placed the stolen envelope on a desk in the 
back room on the morning of the burglary (T. 10). Two other 
Handy Pantry employees, Valerie Swaner and Creed Anderson, saw 
defendant in the store on the day of the burglary (T. 36, 45). 
Ordena Longton said she and defendant were at the store on the day 
of the burglary, and that when defendant came out of the store he 
had the stolen envelope in his possession (T. 52, 55). Under Utah 
law, since defendant was in possession of the stolen property and 
did not offer a satisfactory explanation of this possession, the 
jury was allowed to infer that he committed the burglary (see jury 
instruction #18, Appendix). The circumstantial evidence, coupled 
with the inference legally allowed from the evidence, was 
sufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of 
defendant's entry into the back room. 
Defendant next argues that the State failed to present 
evidence that if he did enter the back room, his entry was 
unlawful. It is not clear whether defendant is claiming that his 
entry was authorized because the back room was actually open to 
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the public, or because he did not receive notice that the back 
room was closed to the public. In either case, defendant's 
contention is unsupported by the evidence. 
It is true that as a matter of law entry into areas 
open to the public cannot be unlawful. However, several courts 
have held that within a retail store open to the public, 
separately secured portions of the store can be considered off 
limits to the public so that entry into those areas is 
unauthorized. In Leppek v. State. 636 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1981), the 
defendant was convicted of burglary when he entered a basement 
storeroom in a drugstore. The defendant argued on appeal that it 
was legally impossible to commit burglary of a store that was open 
to the public. The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the defendant's 
convictionf finding that the basement storeroom was not open to 
the public since "[tlhere was no purpose for the general public to 
have access to it. The store owner testified that they fdidnft 
allow people to go down in the basement1.n JLd.at 1120. In Sims 
v. Statef 613 S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1981), the defendant was convicted 
of burglary when he entered the back room of a convenience store. 
Even though he claimed that he was looking for a restroom, the 
court upheld his conviction saying that "the back room was not 
open to the public because the door was closed and marked 
'employees only'." Id. at 821. 
It is clear from these cases that a separately secured 
portion of a retail store can be closed to the public and 
"therefore be the object of a burglary. In the present case 
>reston Tholen, the owner of the Handy Pantry, testified that the 
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back room is off limits to the public and that no one but 
employees are allowed to enter it (T. 22, 28). Additionally, the 
evidence showed a sign posted on the door to the back room that 
unambiguously gave notice of that fact (T. 27). That this 
evidence was sufficient to show that the back room was not in fact 
open to the public is confirmed by Judge Banks1 comments in 
denying defendant's motion to dismiss, quoted supra. 
Defendant also seems to argue that even if the back 
room was closed to the public, he was not given notice of that 
fact, and therefore his entry was licensed and lawful. In a case 
similar to the case at bar, Hanson v. State. 52 Wis.2d 396, 190 
N.W.2d 129 (1971), in appealing his burglary conviction, the 
defendant tried to argue that the State had failed to prove that 
he knew that his entry was without consent. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court upheld his conviction and said: 
[Defendant] would have the state assume the 
burden of showing [his] state of mind. In 
the circumstances of this case, it is 
apparent that the burden was not upon the 
state to show that the defendant did not know 
that his entry was without consent . . . In 
this case there was no consent in fact. The 
defendant's state of mind is irrelevant 
because he makes no assertion that he assumed 
he had consent. . . . Unless the defendant 
makes some attempt to explain away the 
evidence that there was no consent in fact, 
the state has no obligation to assert or 
prove the subjective state of the defendant's 
mind. The evidence makes it clear, and the 
trial judge so held, that the defendant knew 
that no consent had been granted, and under 
the facts of this case, no additional proof 
was required. 
Hanson at 132-33. Although Hanson involved interpretation of a 
statute defining consent, the same reasoning applies in the case 
at bar. 
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In the instant case, defendant argues for the first 
time on appeal that because the store's bathroom was located in 
the back room his entry into the back room might have been to find 
a bathroom and that therefore the State should have been required 
to prove that he received notice that his entry was not licensed. 
However, he made no attempt at trial to explain away the evidence 
that there was no consent in fact or to assert that he believed 
that his entry was licensed. Therefore, the State should not be 
required to show the subjective state of defendant's mind. 
Moreover, the trial judge, who was present during the 
testimony and presentation of physical evidence, including 
photographs, was best qualified to decide this issue. Judge 
Banks' comments, quoted supra, indicate that the evidence adduced 
at trial was sufficient to submit to the jury the issue of whether 
defendant received notice. The jury instruction on burglary (see 
jury instruction #19, Appendix) required the jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant entered the Handy Pantry back room 
Doth unlawfully and knowinglyP and the jury found defendant 
juilty. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to warrant 
submitting to the jury the issue of defendant's unlawful entry, 
tnd the trial judge was correct in denying defendant's motion to 
tismiss. 
B. THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S 
INTENT TO COMMIT THEFT AT THE 
TIME OF HIS UNLAWFUL ENTRY. 
Defendant argues that the State failed to present prima 
acie evidence that when he unlawfully entered the back room, he 
id so with the intent to commit a theft or other felony. In 
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State v. Brooks. Utah, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (1981), this Court stated 
"[s]ince the intent to commit a theft is a state of mind, which is 
rarely susceptible of direct proof, it can be inferred from 
conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior 
and experience." Defendant claims that no such evidence of 
conduct or circumstances was presented to support the inference 
that he entered the back room with the requisite intent. It is 
true that he was not caught in the back room and that no one saw 
him enter or leave the back room. However, Ordena Longton 
testified that immediately after leaving the Handy Pantry 
defendant was in possession of the checks stolen from the back 
room (T. 55). Furthermore, Merna Norwick and Sharon Spencer 
testified that he was in possession of the stolen checks later 
that night (T. 73, 75-76, 81, 83), and the arresting police 
officers found some of the stolen items in the car he was driving 
the following morning (T. 93). In BrooksP this Court stated that 
in cases where there is an actual stealing the intent to steal at 
the time of the unlawful entry is "apparent." Brooks at 881. 
Numerous other courts have gone further and held that the trial 
court was warranted in inferring guilt from the fact that goods 
stolen from the burgled building were found in possession of the 
defendant (ji££, e.g. . State v. Carver. 94 Id. 677, 496 P.2d 676 
(1972); State v. Talley, 112 Ariz. 268, 540 P.2d 1249 (1975)). 
In People v. Renteria. 162 Ca.2d 590, 328 P.2d 266 (1958), a 
California District Court of Appeals held that an inference that 
the defendant had the requisite intent to steal when he entered 
the burgled residence was appropriate when he was found in 
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possession of items stolen from the residence and, when questioned 
about the ownership of the items he gave false, evasive, and 
inconsistent answers. In the instant case, not only was defendant 
found in possession of the stolen checks, but when the arresting 
officers questioned him about them, he denied any knowledge of 
them (T. 110). In view of the testimony of the previously 
mentioned witnesses, this answer was clearly false and evasive. 
Additional evidence was adduced at trial that would 
support the inference that defendant had the intent to commit 
theft when he entered the back room. Although the bank statement 
was in plain view on top of a desk, the blank checks were hidden 
in a box under the desk, and would require a search to be found 
(T. 24, 31). Furthermore, defendant told Ordena Longton that he 
knew someone who could "use" the checks (T. 55-56), and Ms. 
Longton testified that defendant knew someone who could forge the 
checks for a great deal of money (T. 103). This evidence, 
together with the evidence that defendant was in possession of the 
stolen checks and lied about his possession, is sufficient to 
establish the element of defendants intent to commit a theft at 
;he time of his unlawful entry into the back room. Therefore, the 
irial court was correct in denying defendant's motion to dismiss 
'or failure of the State to present a prima facie case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of the 
ourt below should be affirmed. 
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APPENDIX 
- 3 3 -
INSTRUCTION NO. \Y 
Utah Law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently 
stolen when no satisfactory explanation 
of such possession is made, shall be 
prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
Thus if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in possession of 
stolen property, that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then you may 
infer from those facts that the defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find it 
justified by the evidence, to connect the possessor of recently 
stolen property with the offense of burglary. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /'? 
Before you convict the defendant, LAWRENCE PITTS, 
of the crime of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of August, 1984, 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, LAWRENCE PITTS, 
entered or remained in the building of Handy Pantry; 
2. That he did so unlawfully; 
3. That he did so intentionally or knowingly; 
4. That he did so with the intent to commit a theft. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the State has proved each and every one of the above-mentioned 
elements, it is your duty to convict the Defendant. On the 
other hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or 
more of said elements, then you should find the Defendant not 
guilty. 
Before you may convict the defendant of the offense 
of Theft, a lesser included offense of Burglary, the State 
must prove each and every one of the following elements to 
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about August 4, 1984, defendant 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Handy Pantry. 
2. With the intent to deprive Handy Pantry of the 
property. 
3. That all acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
If the State has proven each and every one of the 
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable 
doubt# then it is your duty to convict defendant of the offense 
of Theft/ a lesser and included offense of Burglary in the 
Information. 
